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Abstract:  The paper reports on a 
Socratic exercise that introduces 
participants to the norm of rational 
entitlement, as distinct from political 
entitlement, and the attendant norm 
of rational responsibility. The exer-
cise demonstrates that, because par-
ticipants are not willing to exchange 
their own opinion at random for an-
other differing opinion to which the 
owner is, by the participants’ own 
admission, entitled, they treat their 
entitlement to their own opinion 
differently, giving it a special status. 
This gives rise to rational obligations 
such as the obligation to provide 
reasons, and a willingness to risk 
those opinions to the force of the 
better reason. 
Résumé:  On décrit un exercice so-
cratique qui initie des participants à 
la norme de droit rationnel, distingué 
du droit politique, et à la norme 
d’accompagnement, la responsabilité 
rationnelle. Les exercices démon-
trent aux participants que, puisqu’ils 
ne sont pas prêts à échanger leur 
propre opinion au hasard pour une 
autre opinion à laquelle ils ont droit, 
ils traitent différemment leur droit à 
leur propre opinion, ce qui donne à 
leur opinion un statut particulier. 
Cela donne lieu à des obligations 
rationnelles telles que l'obligation 
d’avancer des raisons ainsi que 
l’obligation d’être disposé à rempla-
cer leurs raisons par des meilleures 
raisons.  
 
Keywords: evidence proportionalism, rational entitlement, rational obliga-




For if anyone, no matter who, were given the opportunity of 
choosing amongst all the nations of the world the beliefs he 
thought best, he would inevitably, after careful consideration of 
their relative merits, choose those of his own country. Every-
one without exception believes his own native customs, and the 
religion he was brought up in, to be the best…There is abun-
dant evidence that this is the universal feeling about the ancient 
customs of one’s country. One might recall…an account told 
of Darius. When he was king of Persia, he summoned the 
Greeks who happened to be at his court and asked them what 
they would take to eat the dead bodies of their fathers. They 
replied that they would not do it for any money in the world. 
Later, in the presence of the Greeks…he asked some Indi-
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ans…who do in fact eat their parents’ dead bodies, what they 
would take to burn them. They uttered a cry of horror and for-
bade him to mention such a dreadful thing. One can see by this 
what custom can do and Pindar, in my opinion, was right when 




[T]here is … one unerring mark of … [the love of truth, name-
ly:]  not entertaining any proposition with greater assurance 











1.  Introduction 
 
This article takes its inspiration from Patrick Stokes’s recent 
contribution “No, you’re not entitled to your opinion” to the 
online academic journal The Conversation (October 5, 2012). 
Stokes, a lecturer in philosophy at Deakin University, in Mel-
bourne, Australia, describes the following conversation he has 
with his students at the beginning of term: 
 
I say something like this: “I’m sure you’ve heard the ex-
pression ‘everyone is entitled to their opinion.’ Perhaps 
you’ve even said it yourself, maybe to head off an argu-
ment or bring one to a close. Well, as soon as you walk 
into this room, it’s no longer true. You are not entitled to 
your opinion. You are only entitled to what you can ar-
gue for.” (Stokes, 2012) 
 
Reading this reminded me of an exercise I’ve been doing in my 
introductory classrooms for a couple of years now—an exercise 
which I thought worth sharing. While it’s not so dramatic as to 
claim that people are not entitled to their opinions, it does en-
deavor to show that the kinds of entitlements people claim for 
their own opinions not only differ in kind from those entitle-
ments which everyone with an opinion has, but also come with 
some rather special obligations. 
                                                 
1
 Herodotus. (1996). The histories. A. de Selincourt, (trans.). New York: 
Penguin. 
2
 Locke, J. ([1690] 1975). Essay concerning human understanding. P.H. 
Nidditch (ed.). Oxford: Oxford UP, p. 697. 
3
  Hume, D. ([1777] 1975). Enquiries concerning human understanding and 
concerning the principles of morals. Oxford: Clarendon Press, p. 110. 
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 At the beginning of each of my introductory philosophy 
classes, I conduct an exercise which endeavors to show, in a So-
cratic way, that there is a difference in kind between the entitle-
ment we grant that everyone else has to their opinion, and the 
entitlement we claim to have for our own opinions. These kinds 
of entitlement are distinguished as political, in the first instance, 
and rational, in the second. The exercise works by demonstrat-
ing to participants that they take their entitlement to their own 
opinions to be something more than a mere political entitlement, 
because they do not treat the two entitlements equivalently. That 
is, since they are not willing to exchange their own opinion at 
random for another differing opinion to which the owner is, by 
the participants’ own admission, entitled, they treat their enti-
tlement to their own opinion differently, giving it a special sta-
tus. At that point, we begin a conversation about the differences 
between these kinds of entitlement. I then endeavor to show par-
ticipants that the claim of a rational entitlement to a view gives 
rise to certain rational obligations—obligations which do not 
attach to mere political entitlement—such as the obligation to 
provide reasons for the opinions to which a rational entitlement 
is claimed, as well as a willingness to risk those opinions to the 
force of the better reason.
4
 
                                                 
4
 For the purposes of this paper, I treat the terms “opinion” and “belief” 
equivalently, while recognizing that they are not synonymous. As one re-
viewer rightly observed, “the notion of being entitled to your opinion is far 
more entrenched than a notion of being entitled to your beliefs.” Generally, 
students come to my classroom having been taught that there is a fact-
opinion divide, such that the two are categorically different from one another. 
Facts are unarguable truths occurring in a realm where answers are definitely 
right or wrong, while opinions occur in some other realm where truth is not 
possible or is unavailable. As such, not only are opinions contestable, they 
are not objectively right or wrong. This simplistic mischaracterization of the 
difference between fact and opinion is one of the first anti-rational biases I 
attempt to rid my students of. Thinking of opinions as beliefs is one way to 
begin “unlearning” this bias. Beliefs aim at the truth: to believe a claim is to 
take it to be true. And, beliefs have a mind-to-world fit: the conditions for the 
truth of a belief are the same as the conditions for the truth of its contents. 
These characteristics give beliefs a specifically epistemic dimension which is 
frequently, erroneously, and irresponsibly ignored when talking of opinions, 
particularly as contextualized by the “fact-opinion divide.” I suspect that this 
is the reason behind the difference observed by the reviewer. Yet, beliefs are 
things that we take to be true, and in this respect they are not different from 
opinions. Opinions are views that we hold, and views that we take ourselves 
to be right in holding – that is, we take our opinions to be true. We have the 
opinions we do because we believe them to be true, i.e., we take them to be 
factual. It is opinion’s claim to correctness, truth, and factuality that closes 
the fact-opinion divide and compels one to undertake the rational responsibil-
ities advocated herein. 
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 This pedagogical note offers a lesson plan for an exercise 
which is designed to teach, through a kind of experiential, dis-
cursive, and Socratic learning, the difference between political 
and rational entitlement to one’s opinion, and some of the re-
sponsibilities which come with claims to rational entitlement. I 
report on some of the discussion which tends to arise from the 
exercise, as well as some of the “teaching points” which I try to 
include in the lesson. In addition to the lesson plan, a take-home 
assignment is supplied in an Appendix. The assignment is de-
signed to prompt students to begin to think critically about their 
own views by having them articulate the reasons they have for 
an opinion while considering not only why someone might think 
differently but what it would take to get them to change their 
mind. The idea here is that there should be a connection between 
their reasons and what would change their mind, and that their 




2.  Rational entitlement and responsibility:  
 Lesson plan for a group exercise 
 
In brief, the lesson plan for the exercise can be given in the fol-
lowing steps, which are discussed further below. I conduct this 
exercise in classrooms of about 35 students, in a class period of 
1 hour and 15 minutes. It would perhaps be feasible with a much 
larger group of participants, although this would likely require a 
technological way of collecting, randomizing, and distributing 
the opinions polled. 
 
Steps: 
1. Formulate opinion poll question. 
2. Conduct opinion poll. 
3. Randomize and redistribute opinions (discussion of 
Socrates the gadfly). 
4. Survey for voluntary exchange of opinions. 
5. Discussion: Entitled to your opinion. 
6. Discussion: Valuing opinions. 
7. Rational entitlement & Rational responsibility:  
 
Step 1. Formulate opinion poll question 
 
The objective here is to articulate a suitable question. Depending 
on the time available, sometimes I begin with a discussion ques-
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tion such as: What are some of the most pressing and challeng-
ing problems facing society today? This usually yields several 
problems suitable for use as a topical basis for the opinion poll 
question. A brief discussion of these problems can also be used 
to highlight some of the philosophical (social, value-based) di-
mensions of these problems, as against their non-philosophical 
(empirical, technical) aspects. Alternately, one may simply 
come to the exercise having prepared a question for the opinion 
poll. Indeed, having one of these as a back up is generally a 
good idea, just in case discussion does not yield anything suita-
ble. 
 The opinion-poll question itself should be formulated in 
such a way that it is open-ended, allowing for a spectrum of dif-
ferent answers, rather than answers of either “yes” or a “no.” 
Ideally, it should be on a topic that the participants have some 
interest or stake in, and yet one which they have not, perhaps, 
devoted much prior thought to. (The pedagogical benefit of this 
will become apparent later.) Here are some examples of ones I 
designed: 
 
Under what circumstances should… 
…an individual have to give up their private property for 
the public benefit (including things like taxation)? 
…an individual have to surrender some of their liberties 
(e.g., privacy or mobility) for the sake of public (or na-
tional) security? 
 
To what degree do you think that… 
…developed countries should have to subsidize develop-
ing ones in order to offset the causes of global climate 
change due to industrialization? 
…corporate executives and directors should be held mor-
ally, legally, or financially responsible for the activities 
of the companies under their direction? 
…countries and companies that provide arms to warring 
factions should be held legally or morally accountable 
for the actions of the parties they arm? 
 
The opinion-poll question should be written on the board or pro-
jected on the screen at the front of the room, preferably by itself 








©  David Godden.  Informal Logic, Vol. 34, No. 1 (2014), pp. 124-151. 
 
Step 2. Conduct opinion poll 
 
This step requires some blank strips of lined paper (e.g., index 
cards) and something to collect them in. Alternately, it requires 
the technology to have students electronically compose and 
submit their answers to the poll question. Answers must then be 
randomized and redistributed to participants in the exercise. 
 Provide each student with a strip of paper. Instruct them to 
write, in a several complete sentences, their opinion to the poll 
question. They should not include their name. In general, it suits 
the purposes of the exercise to keep this instruction as brief and 
vague as possible. What you are aiming for is to have a detailed 
or nuanced opinion, but one which does not include any reasons. 
Once each student has had a chance to write their opinion on the 
paper, collect them. 
 
Step 3. Randomize and redistribute opinions  
 (discussion of Socrates the gadfly) 
  
The activity of this stage involves randomizing and redistrib-
uting the opinions to the participants. This may be done by hav-
ing each participant blindly select an opinion, or by randomly 
redistributing them (perhaps by some electronic means). I use 
the time involved in this activity to begin a brief discussion 
about Socratic wisdom. 
 During this stage of the exercise, as I circulate the room 
randomly redistributing the opinions, I will typically ask the 
students how many of them felt themselves to be particularly 
well-informed about the issue, or had given the question much 
thought prior to the exercise. Ideally, and typically, very few 
students will answer affirmatively here. At this point, I ask the 
students how many of them actually wrote down that they didn’t 
feel well-informed enough about the topic to have a considered 
opinion. Normally, no one will have done this, though some 
might respond that they would have had they considered it to be 
an option. 
 Time allowing, I take the following digression. I observe 
that, on the face of it, it is curious that, generally speaking, we 
feel both willing, and perhaps even obliged, to form and articu-
late an opinion on matters about which we have little 
knowledge. When asked why we tend to behave this way, stu-
dents frequently report that ignorance—not knowing some-
thing—is looked upon negatively in our classrooms and work-
places. Ignorance and error seem to have the same standing in 
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these settings, so it is better to risk some answer, which carries 
with it the chance of being right, than to admit ignorance, which 
guarantees that one will be wrong. Yet, through the story of 
Socrates the gadfly, I try to show students: (i) there are many 
things worse than ignorance—especially, mistakenly believing 
that one knows when, in fact, one does not, and indeed (ii) that a 
meta-cognitive awareness of one’s ignorance about some topic 
has cognitive virtues—particularly, that knowing that one does 
not know is conducive to learning in a way that mistakenly be-
lieving that one already knows is not. 
 No doubt, my readers will be well familiar with the story 
of Socrates in The Apology, though my students typically are 
not—indeed this is typically their first introduction to the char-
acter of Socrates. Yet, since the point of this story is tangential 
to the main point of the exercise, I tend to be brief in its retell-
ing. I focus on Socrates’ response to the paradoxical prophesy of 
the Oracle of Delphi. The Oracle, you will remember, divined 
that Socrates was the wisest man in all of Athens, even though 
Socrates himself believed that he possessed no wisdom whatso-
ever. In testing this prophesy, Socrates became the character of 
the “gadfly” challenging his fellow Athenians to articulate their 
claims to wisdom, and then submitting claimants to his Socratic 
questioning, eventually leading them to a stunned state of aporia 
at the “torpedo-fish” moment when they realize that they do not 
actually possess the wisdom they thought they did. The moral of 
the story, I take it, is not merely that Socrates might well have 
actually been the wisest of Athenians (despite his tragic fate), 
but that knowledge of one’s ignorance is a kind of wisdom pref-
erable to mistakenly believing that one knows when one does 
not. 
 
Step 4. Survey for voluntary exchange of opinions 
  
Returning to the main exercise, at this point I ask students two 
survey questions, the results of which I record for all to see. 
First, students are asked whether they are willing to simply ex-
change their own opinion, the one they contributed, for the one 
they randomly selected—that is, whether they are willing to give 
up their former view and adopt the opinion of a random peer in 
its stead. Results are recorded, both affirmative and negative, as 
a raw number and as a percentage of responses. Following this, I 
ask each group whether they counted the opinion they randomly 
drew as roughly equivalent to their own (the one they contribut-
ed). 
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Survey Questions: 
1. Are you willing to exchange your own opinion for the 
one you selected at random?  
2. (Of each group) Do you count the opinion you selected 
as roughly the same as your own? 
 
Willing to exchange 
opinion? 







 Typically the vast majority of participants are unwilling to 
simply exchange their own opinion for the one that they ran-
domly selected or were assigned. While it doesn’t really matter 
how many of each group count the random opinion as roughly 
the same as their own, the point here is to demonstrate that we 
are more willing to exchange our opinions when we view them 
as much like our own, and are increasingly unwilling to ex-
change our opinions the more we see them as unlike our own. 
(Rarely, a person will select their own opinion back, and this 
simply gives a limiting case of the first kind.) Normally, I chal-
lenge participants to say why they would not be willing to ex-
change their opinion for one they count as roughly equivalent to 
their own. Usually I’m told that the details constituting the dif-
ference are the reason. Similarly, I challenge participants who 
are willing to exchange their opinion for one that they count as 
not basically similar to their own. Here participants have a va-
riety of answers. Sometimes students will remark at this juncture 
that they were unwilling to exchange their opinion for the other 
because they were merely given an alternative point of view 
without any reasons for preferring the other to their own. Since 
this comment anticipates future discussion, it is best to 
acknowledge it and move on quickly, perhaps saying something 
like “Well that seems important somehow, doesn’t it? We 
should get back to that.” (This is one of the reasons why it is 
preferable to phrase the survey question in such a way as that it 
just invites opinions, rather than arguments.) 
 At this point, while remarking that these results are inter-
esting, I introduce—almost as an aside—a final survey question 
which, hopefully, will create some cognitive dissonance in the 
participants, and which will serve as a focal point for further 
discussion. 
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Final survey question: 
3. Out of curiosity, how many of you think that the other 
person is entitled to their opinion? 
 
The results here are often unanimous. Participants consistently 
agree that people are entitled to their opinions—regardless of 
whether they themselves agree with that opinion or are willing 
to adopt it as, or in exchange for, their own. 
 
Step 5. Discussion: Entitled to your opinion 
 
At this juncture, I make a point of observing to participants the 
apparent tension in their responses. How is it that they can say 
that a person is entitled to their opinion—indeed, just as entitled 
as they are to their own—and yet they are unwilling to exchange 
their own opinion for one selected at random to which the au-
thor is, by their own admission, entitled? In a good group, I will 
even challenge the participants to identify this tension for them-
selves. Either way, identifying this tension opens a collective 
discussion of the following question: 
 
Discussion question: What do we mean when we say that 
a person is entitled to their opinion, even if we disagree 
with it or are unwilling to adopt it as our own? 
 
Responses to this question have included points like the follow-
ing, which I record on the board: 
 
 It means that I will respect them as individuals, and not 
bear them any ill-will, even though they do not share my 
views. 
 It means that I respect their opinion, even though I don’t 
agree with it. 
 It means that I will not try to take their opinion away from 
them by, e.g., forcing my opinion on them, and I expect 
that they will not try to force their opinion on me. 
 It means that a person’s opinions are a product of their 
own experience of the world which, while different from 
mine, is just as valid. 
 It means that everyone is allowed to have their own view 
of things, and that no one is really right or wrong. 
 It means that everyone’s opinion counts the same. 
 It means that this is America where people have the free-
dom to think what they want and to say what they think. 
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 It means they’re entitled to be wrong. 
 
 There tends to be a wide variety of responses to this ques-
tion, and it can lead to a rather open-ended discussion among 
students. One of the points that frequently emerges at this point 
(and if it doesn’t it is worth drawing out) is that people identify 
themselves with their opinions. They take their opinions to be a 
reflection of who they are, and a product of their experience of 
the world. Thus, to invalidate a person’s opinion is, in some im-
portant sense, to invalidate, negate, or reject that person’s expe-
rience of the world, and thereby the person themselves. It seems 
to me that this is one of the attitudes informing the rhetoric of 
“entitlement” and “respectful difference” characteristic of the 
arena of public debate today. As the exercise progresses, it is 
designed to expose the problematic aspects of these attitudes. 
 At this point in the discussion it should be pointed out 
that, although we say these nice things about respecting other 
people and their opinions, the fact is we do not value all opin-
ions the same. 
 
Step 6. Discussion: Valuing opinions 
 
The proof here is simple: if you assigned the same value to the 
opinions of others as you do to your own, you would be willing 
to exchange them for yours. But you aren’t willing to make such 
exchanges, so you don’t value them the same. 
 This point can be illustrated with the following example. 
Suppose instead of each of you contributing your opinion to the 
box, you each put a dollar (specify, bill or coin here) from your 
pocket into the box, and you then selected one at random. By a 
show of hands, how many of you would be willing to exchange? 
By and large here, participants express a willingness to make 
this exchange. (When they don’t is it often because of a concern 
over the condition of the currency, which would prevent them 
from spending it on certain occasions, e.g., in a vending ma-
chine.) The point here is that they value each dollar the same. As 
participants often tell me: a dollar, is a dollar, is a dollar—they 
all spend the same.  
 This leads to the next discussion question: how do we val-
ue opinions? There are a variety of ways to begin discussion of 
this question, but one way I have used (for reasons which will 
soon become apparent) is this: 
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Discussion Question: Since you are willing to exchange 
your dollar for another’s, but unwilling to exchange your 
opinion for another’s, what is the difference that makes 
your opinion so preferable that you are unwilling to make 
the exchange? 
Responses to this question have included points like the 
following, which I again record on the board: 
 
 Opinions are more like pairs of jeans than dollar bills. 
Dollars all spend the same. And while all pairs of jeans 
are basically the same, I’m more comfortable with mine. 
My pair of jeans fits me better than yours do, and that’s 
why I prefer mine to yours. 
 Opinions aren’t like dollar bills, they’re more like a 
farmer’s crops. My opinions are things that I’ve made—
they are a product of my efforts and experience. I culti-
vated my opinions, and what I value about them is the 
work that I have put into them. 
 Opinions aren’t like dollar bills because our opinions are 
a product of our upbringing. We have the opinions we 
do because they are what we have been taught and what 
we have been brought up to think. 
 Opinions aren’t like dollar bills because our opinions are 
a reflection of ourselves. We invest of ourselves in our 
opinions. We identify with our opinions, so to change 
your opinion is to change something of yourself. 
 
 As is hopefully clear, the purpose of inviting students to 
consider how they value opinions in this way is to prompt them 
to articulate a number of answers to which they are inclined but 
which don’t work, in the hopes of getting them to see for them-
selves why answers such as these don’t work. (On this point, 
students will also often say things like: (i) that they think their 
opinion is right, and have no reason for thinking the other opin-
ion is right, or (ii) that they were not given any reasons for the 
other opinion, so they were given no reason to make the ex-
change. Again here, it is worthwhile to acknowledge these 
points, but return to them only later in the discussion.) 
 Moving through the recorded list, it is often possible to 
note a (partial) trend. In general, the reasons people tend to cite 
have to do with the relationship of the opinion to its owner—
specifically between their own opinions and themselves. My 
opinions fit me better than yours do; they are a reflection of me, 
my upbringing, and my experience of the world. The motivating 
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attitude here seems to be something like this: just as invalidating 
a person’s opinion is to invalidate that person’s experience—or 
even the person themselves—people’s inclination to prefer their 
own opinions is a way of being true to themselves, and affirming 
their own experience of the world. Problematically, this ap-
proach leads to a pre-critical method of valuing opinions based 
on their similarity to one’s own. Generally, we are more willing 
to exchange opinions the more that they are like our own, and 
increasingly less willing to exchange opinions as they become 
increasingly unlike our own. That is to say, we tend to evaluate 
opinions based on whether we like them or agree with them. If 
an opinion is like mine then it is okay, and if it is not like mine 
then it is bad. 
 Yet, showing participants that this is not the way they ac-
tually value opinions is relatively straightforward. To illustrate 
this, I modify the currency example just used. If, instead of a 
single dollar, everyone put into the box the sum of money they 
have in their pockets, wallets and purses right now, there are 
some circumstances under which you would be willing to ex-
change your contribution for theirs, and some in which you 
would not. That is to say, you will make the exchange when you 
value the amount of money they contributed more than you val-
ue the amount of money you contributed. So, to learn how you 
value opinions, perhaps you should consider and articulate un-
der what circumstances you actually would be willing to ex-
change your present opinion for another. This leads to the final 
discussion question, the results of which are again recorded: 
 
Final Discussion Question: Under what circumstances 
would you be willing to exchange your opinion for anoth-
er’s—i.e., to adopt their view as your own? 
 
 If not unanimous, responses to this question tend to cluster 
around a few key points, or conditions for exchange: 
 
 If someone could convince me that my opinion was wrong 
and that theirs was correct. 
 If their opinion took into account considerations which I 
had not previously considered. (If someone were looking 
at the issue in a way that I hadn’t before, and in a way 
that my view did not take account of.) 
 If someone had reasons for their view which I thought 
were better than my reasons. 
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 Of course, sometimes the change in view here is not a 
wholesale replacement. Students often prefer to qualify their an-
swers in terms of when they would be willing to modify their 
own view, but the moral of the story remains the same. 
 At this juncture, what participants should recognize—
indeed, what should be emphasized to them—is that none of the 
features pertaining to the relationship of opinions to their own-
ers factor into their conditions for exchange. You value your 
own opinion not because it is yours, and not because of any rela-
tionship it has to you. Rather, you value it because you think 
that it is worth having—that is, that it is worth more than the 
other opinions out there. And, you’d gladly exchange it for one 
that you thought was worth more. 
 And, the worth of opinions comes from their relationship 
to the world, not from their relationship to their owners. You 
value an opinion not because of how well it fits you, but because 
of how well you think it fits the world. You do not believe 
things that you think are wrong—even if you really want them 
to be true. You would, or at least you should, exchange a con-
venient falsehood for an inconvenient truth.
5
 Next, as you grow 
up, you do not retain all the views of those who brought you up. 
(People typically use the “this is what I was brought up to be-
lieve” reason highly selectively, conveniently ignoring all those 
beliefs that they were brought up to have but subsequently re-
jected.) Rather, you only retain those that you accept as your 
own—those that you judge are true or that your community was 
right to believe. Further, you identify yourself with your present 
beliefs because you take them to be true, and you take yourself 
to have a view of the world that is generally right. When you 
become convinced that another view is actually right (i.e., better 
than the one you presently hold), you no longer identify yourself 
with the old view; rather, you identify with the new view. And, 
you do not perceive changing your mind in those circumstances 
as an affront to your identity; rather, it seems like the natural 
and sensible thing to do. (Indeed, we acquire new beliefs and 
change our mind about existing beliefs continuously in our con-
scious lives.) Finally, even if you invested a great deal of re-
sources and effort into arriving at a view which you (subse-
                                                 
5
 I leave aside here questions of the will to believe, and of pragmatic reasons 
for believing unknowns or falsehoods, e.g., the benefits of the placebo effect. 
As worthwhile as this discussion is, it is premature for the audience envis-
aged, and beside the point of the exercise anyway. In the end it represents a 
set of outlying cases only. Generally the practical benefits of avoiding errors 
outweigh those of embracing them. 
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quently) came to think was mistaken, you would, or should, ex-
change the hard-earned mistake for the easily-acquired truth. 
Although you might still value the work you invested in your 
mistakes, because you can learn from them, this value should 
only be instrumental. You should value the learning, and what 
you learned from your mistakes (the acquisition of truth), not 
the error that precipitated the learning. In the end, people who 
focus, as pre-critical thinkers do, merely on relations between 
opinions and themselves, take ownership of their views but no 
accountability for them. 
 





We have now reached the point in the exercise where it is time 
to reveal the moral of the story. To begin, it is best to remind 
participants of some of the attitudes and responses they ex-
pressed throughout the exercise, and then to note some of the 
consequences deriving therefrom. 
 First, participants should be reminded that their unwilling-
ness to exchange their own opinion for another’s shows that 
they value their own opinion differently than the other opinion. 
Yet, participants can also be reminded, despite their unwilling-
ness to adopt the other opinion, they counted the holder of that 
opinion as entitled to it. As such, and despite the rhetoric of re-
spect and toleration that accompanies such attributions of enti-
tlement, participants do not treat the entitlement they grant to 
anyone with an opinion the same as the entitlement they claim 
to have for their own opinions. Rather, the kind of entitlement 
they claim for themselves affords their own opinions a special 
status such that they are correct in their unwillingness to ex-
change their opinion for another. This point should be stressed. 
It’s not just that participants won’t change their minds; partici-
pants implicitly claim that they are right not to do so—that they 
shouldn’t have to, that they are under no obligation to. 
 At this point, the distinction between political and rational 
entitlement can be introduced. Political entitlement is the sort of 
                                                 
6
 Although I make no attempt to show this here, I take the account of rational 
responsibilities, entitlements, and standards given in this section to be both 
broadly consistent with, and within the same theoretical and methodological 
spirit as, the design stance to argumentative norms (Goodwin 2002, 2007). 
Goodwin, J. (2002). One question, two answers. In H.V. Hansen et al. (Eds.), 
Argument and its applications: Proceedings of OSSA 2001, CD-ROM 
(pp. 1-17). Windsor, ON: OSSA. 
Goodwin, J. (2007). Argument has no function. Informal Logic, 27, 69-90. 
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entitlement we grant to anyone with an opinion, regardless of 
how we value that opinion. People can be politically entitled to 
their opinions even in cases where we judge the opinion itself to 
be not merely false, but completely wrong-headed, or even of-
fensive or bigoted. Political entitlement, as we will see, comes 
with very little obligation on the part of the person who holds it. 
Nevertheless, granting someone political entitlement to their 
opinions creates corresponding duties in us. Firstly, we take on 
the responsibility of allowing them to make up their own minds 
about things and not forcing (e.g., through coercion or brain-
washing) them to accept some set of beliefs. Equally, we take on 
the obligation of not silencing or imprisoning them because of 
their views.
7
 On the other hand, there are duties which are not 
created when political entitlement is granted. For example we do 
not take on the responsibility of placing any credence in the 
view, or of paying it any heed when forming our own view. As 
such, in the marketplace of ideas, political entitlement is little 
more than the right to be wrong and ignored. 
 Rational entitlement, by contrast, is the kind of entitlement 
we claim for ourselves when we assert that we are justified in 
our unwillingness to exchange our opinions for others. Unlike 
claims to political entitlement, claims to rational entitlement do 
come with obligations on the part of the claimant. By claiming 
that we are right in not trading our opinion for another, we cre-
ate obligations for ourselves. First is the obligation to say why 
we are unwilling to exchange our own opinion for any other—
i.e., to say what it is that makes our opinion better, or more val-
uable, than its alternatives (or at least the alternative on offer). 
That is, we create for ourselves the obligation to give reasons for 
our view. 
 Second is the obligation to switch, alter, modify, or quali-
fy our view in the event that we are wrong—that is, if it turns 
out that we are not justified in our unwillingness to exchange 
our view for another. By claiming we are right not to switch our 
view, we are under the obligation to modify our view if our rea-
sons don’t pan out—to modify or surrender our view in the face 
of the better reason. By itself, this obligation does not presup-
pose or prescribe what counts as a good, or better, reason. But 
                                                 
7
 This is not to say that a person who is politically entitled to a view cannot 
suffer censure or even punishment for expressing that view in certain circum-
stances. For example, expressing certain views under the right circumstances 
could constitute an illocutionary (or performative) act (e.g., libel, slander, 
hate speak, bribery, extortion, threat, conspiracy, sedition, or treason), the act 
of which is punishable. 
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our ordinary behavior offers some guidance here. Despite some 
of the things we might be inclined to say (see previous section), 
our behavior reveals that we are willing to change our opinion 
for another (or modify it on the basis of another) when we are 
convinced that the other opinion is right in some way that ours is 
not. Generally, we have the opinions we do because we think 
they are correct; it is not the case that we think an opinion cor-
rect just because we have it. 
 Taken together, this pair of obligations sits at the very 
foundation of our normative practices of giving and asking for 
reasons. The claim that we are right not to switch our view—
i.e., the claim that we are rationally entitled to our position—
commits us to both give satisfactory reasons when called upon 
to do so, and to respond appropriately to the reasons we are pre-
sented with. That is, it commits us to be rational. Understood in 
this way, rationality is a matter of fulfilling this pair of obliga-
tions. 
 Indeed, understanding the nature of rationality as satisfy-
ing the obligations to give and be appropriately moved by rea-
sons provides a standard of rationality. As Siegel (1997, p. 2) 
writes, “to say that one is appropriately moved by reasons is to 
say that one believes, judges, and acts in accordance with the 
probative force with which one’s reasons support one’s beliefs, 
judgments and actions.” Similarly, Pinto (2006, p. 287) writes: 
“rationality is a matter of making our attitudes towards proposi-
tions or propositional contents appropriate to the evidence which 
shapes them.” The central idea here is that being rational in-
volves proportioning our commitment such that it accords with 
the evidence we have. This standard of rationality, perhaps first 
articulated by empiricists like Locke (1690, IV.xix.1; 1975, p. 
697) and Hume (1777, X.i.87; 1975, p. 110), is called evidence 
proportionalism, and has been defined by Engel (2000, p. 3) as 
follows: “In general a belief is rational if it is proportioned to the 
degree of evidence that one has for its truth.”
8
 
                                                 
8
 Siegel, H. (1997). Rationality redeemed: Further dialogues on an educa-
tional ideal. New York: Routledge. 
Pinto, R. (2006). Evaluating inferences: The nature and role of warrants. In-
formal Logic, 26, 287-318. 
Locke, J. (1975). Essay concerning human understanding. P.H. Nidditch 
(ed.). Oxford: Oxford UP. 
Hume, D. (1975). Enquiries concerning human understanding and concern-
ing the principles of morals. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Engel, P. (2000). Introduction: The varieties of belief and acceptance. In P. 
Engel (Ed.), Believing and accepting (pp. 1-30). Dordrecht: Kluwer. 
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 Although the claim to rational entitlement creates certain 
unique obligations for the claimant, it also seeks to impose an 
additional set of duties upon others—duties which do not arise 
from mere political entitlement. Specifically, when we claim to 
be rationally entitled to our view, we claim that it is valuable—it 
is worth having—and as such that others should take heed of it 
and place some credence in it. That is to say, we assert that oth-
ers have a duty to take our view into account when forming their 
own—at least, if they are to be rationally responsible. By the 
same token, by accepting the responsibility of surrendering our 
view to the force of the better reason, we undertake the obliga-
tion of paying heed to their view, at least insofar as they meet 
the obligations that accompany their own claim to rational enti-
tlement. As such, individual claims to rational entitlement create 
an obligation to engage with others in reasoned discourse, and to 
comport our views according to the rational standard of evi-
dence proportionalism. 
 Claims of rational entitlement come with a complex set of 
rational responsibilities. People who claim only political enti-
tlement to their views accept no responsibility for them. Specifi-
cally, they refuse to accept the responsibility of giving a reason 
why they decline to exchange their view for any other, and they 
refuse to surrender their view to the force of the better reason. In 
effect, they are refusing to be rational, and are opting out of the 
entire social practice of rationality—the giving and asking for 




3.  Follow-up assignment 
 
Following this in-class exercise, I assign a take-home writing 
exercise (Appendix, below) whose primary aim is to introduce 
students to the basic attitudes conducive to critical thinking and 
rational responsibility. To successfully complete the assignment, 
students must not only be able to demonstrate a degree of self-
knowledge, by articulating an opinion of their own and the rea-
sons they have for that opinion. They must also have a compara-
tive understanding of their own position (by imagining what 
reasons an intelligent, rational person could have for disagreeing 
with them), and a critical, reflective self-understanding (by iden-
tifying a circumstances under which they would be willing to 
change their mind and give up or modify their present view). 




©  David Godden.  Informal Logic, Vol. 34, No. 1 (2014), pp. 124-151. 
 
 The assignment has four basic components: (i) the first 
requires simply that the student articulate one of their beliefs, 
(ii) the second, that the student articulate the reasons they have 
for their view, (iii) the third, that the student articulate what they 
would require in order to change their mind about that belief, 
and (iv) the fourth requires them to imagine what kinds of rea-
sons an intelligent, rational individual might have for holding a 
different view. 
 Some students find the third component challenging, as it 
involves counter-factual thinking. Clearly, if one believed that 
any of the conditions identified in (iii) were actually satisfied, 
they would not have the belief they articulated initially. Also, 
there is a positivistic flavor to this component. Answers which 
simply state that they would require “good reasons,” “facts,” 
“evidence,” or “being convinced” in order to change their mind 
are to be discouraged (as they miss the point). Instead, what is 
required it that students be able to state specific evidential con-
ditions which they would not only count against their belief, but 
which would, indeed, prompt them to modify or surrender their 
belief if satisfied. While students needn’t adopt an entirely con-
trary view here, what is important is that they are able to articu-
late specific conditions under which they would modify their 
view. 
 A comparison of the answers given at stages (ii) and (iii) 
of the assignment frequently yields the following important re-
sult. Not only is there seldom any discernible connection be-
tween a person’s stated reasons for their view and what they re-
quire to change their mind, but what people demand in order to 
change their mind is typically out of all proportion with the rea-
sons or evidence they have given for holding the view in the 
first place. That is, rather than naively adopting a standard of 
evidence proportionalism for their own views, people untrained 
in critical thinking normally favor their own opinions in a way 
that is disproportionate to the evidence they have for them. For 
example, as I emphasize in the class discussion following the 
assignment, people ought to revise, or at least revisit, their 
commitment to a belief if the reasons that they profess to have 
for the belief are shown to be mistaken. Generally and ceteris 
paribus, one of the things that should occasion changing one’s 
mind about something is the discovery that one’s reasons are 
defective. Yet, typically, students almost never articulate this as 
a condition in part (iii) of the assignment.  
 Another result which sometimes occurs during stage (iii) 
of the assignment is that the student will claim, or perhaps even 
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discover, that there is absolutely nothing that would get them to 
change their mind about one of their views. One way of looking 
at responses of this type is to understand them as limiting cases 
of the disconnection between a person’s stated reasons for a 
view and what they require to revisit or revise the view. If noth-
ing really would get them to change their minds, then clearly 
they do not hold the view on the basis of the stated reasons. Af-
ter all, if the view were held on the basis of reasons, then the 
defeat of those reasons should occasion the abandoning, or at 
least revisiting, of commitment to the view. This brings us to a 
second way of looking at responses of this sort. Saying that 
there is nothing at all that would get you to change your mind 
about something is to hold that belief beyond the reach of rea-
son, and thereby to place a limit on reason itself. Such a discov-
ery tells you something of singular importance about yourself, 
since it reveals that you do not hold the view in question ration-
ally—i.e., on the basis of reasons. Rather you hold it in some 
way that is prior to, or independent of, all reason and reasoning. 
Now, while I grant that this may be fair enough on occasions 
that are both limited and extreme, I encourage students to rec-
ognize how they react when others make such claims. When 
other people are entirely unwilling to reconsider their own 
views, especially in cases where we disagree with them, we find 
such obstinance condemnable rather than commendable. Instead 
of viewing it as a character strength that one will stand on the 
strength of their convictions, we see it as a character flaw—a 
stubbornness and irrationality that makes it impossible to get 
anywhere with them. And, when such an attitude is taken up in a 
blanket way, it amounts to little more than a refusal to accept 
rational responsibility for one’s views. 
 One of the goals of this exercise and accompanying as-
signment is to train participants to take rational responsibility 
for their own views by forging a strong connection between 
their commitment to a view, the strength of their reasons, and 
what would change their mind. In my efforts to cultivate the atti-
tude of evidence proportionalism in students, I tell them that 
they should be as critical of their own, favored views as they are 
of those that they think are entirely mistaken and misguided. It 
is only by thinking critically about the reasons we have for our 
own views that we can rightly gauge our rational entitlement to 
them, and hence the level of commitment we should place in 
them. 
4.  Addressing shirkers of rational responsibility 
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Before concluding, I suggest some strategies that might be em-
ployed in responding to the student who doesn’t recognize, or is 
disinclined to accept, rational obligations. These considerations 
observe some of the social and pedagogical harms that arise 
from the ambiguity of entitlement, and bear not only on the 
function of criticism but also on how to approach and manage 
diversity in the classroom. 
 
It’s all just opinion 
 
As teachers, especially in the humanities, I expect we have all 
experienced the following reaction from some student: it [insert 
course subject or area topic here] is all just opinion, and every-
one is entitled to their own opinion, so how can my opinion pos-
sibly be (objectively) assessed—or, more specifically, how can 
it not have received the desired grade? 
 While this reaction may well reflect the student’s sincere 
perplexity, it is also a sign that the student has failed to recog-
nize, or refuses to accept, their rational responsibilities. What 
are some effective strategies in responding to such a student? 
 In a sense, the entire exercise and subsequent assignment 
described herein is designed to induce in students the realization 
that rational obligations apply to them. Here are some points 
that can be emphasized in this kind of situation. 
 
   In response to the specific concern that opinions cannot 
(or should not) be graded, I tell my students that I don’t 
grade their opinions—I grade their reasons. It usually 
takes some time for students to fully believe me when I 
say that I really don’t care what their opinions are, but 
am only interested in their reasons—in their ability to ar-
ticulate, reflect upon, and think critically about why they 
believe what they do. It can help to incorporate this di-
rectly into the grading schemes of course work. For ex-
ample, in the assignment given in the Appendix, section 
1 is not qualitatively assessed. Section 2 is qualitatively 
assessed, particularly in terms of whether it ignores or 
takes account of objections articulated in section 4. Simi-
larly, section 3 is qualitatively assessed according to 
whether the defeat of one’s reasons is among the things 
that would get them to change their view, and the extent 
to which there is a connection between their stated rea-
sons and what they would require to change their mind. 
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To move beyond the specifically grade-related aspect of this 
concern, the following points can also be raised. 
 
   In response to the claim that it’s all just opinion so there 
are no right answers¸ it can be observed that it does not 
follow from this that there are no wrong answers, nor 
that some views are not objectively better than others. 
Indeed, the student’s own unwillingness to exchange 
their view for another, and their taking themselves to be 
right in not doing so, shows that they themselves feel 
that some beliefs (their own) are better than others (the 
ones for which they are not willing to trade). 
   Similarly, in response to the claim that it’s all just opin-
ion so all opinions count the same, it can be emphasized 
that the student does not consistently hold this view 
since, as the exercise shows, they are not indifferent to 
the opinion they have. 
    In response to the claim that since it’s all opinion rather 
than fact, there are no wrong answers, the ambiguities 
and inaccuracies of the fact-opinion divide (discussed in 
note 4) can be raised. Basically the point here is that we 
hold the opinions we do because we take them to be fac-
tual. 
 
Besides these problems with the view itself, the following prob-
lematic consequence can also be observed. 
 
   It’s all just opinion is a discussion ender. If all there is to 
say about opinions is that you have yours and I have 
mine and nothing more can be said, then there is no pro-
spect for us to reasonably settle our differences. 
 
As Stokes writes: 
 
The problem with “I’m entitled to my opinion” is that, all 
too often, it’s used to shelter beliefs that should have 
been abandoned. It becomes shorthand for “I can say or 
think whatever I like”—and by extension, continuing to 
argue is somehow disrespectful. And this attitude feeds, I 
suggest, into the false equivalence between experts and 
non-experts that is an increasingly pernicious feature of 
our public discourse. (Stokes, 2012) 
Intransigence and having the strength of one’s convictions 
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A second set of strategies for addressing the student who is dis-
inclined to accept their rational responsibilities is to invite them 
to look at their response from a different perspective—
specifically from the perspective of one whose opponent refuses 
to accept their rational responsibilities. 
 When presented with this circumstance, students almost 
universally recognize that such a person is being unreasonable. 
At least they will admit that they would not engage with such a 
person as it would be largely pointless. 
 This realization offers a perspicuous view of a perplexing 
general feature of the attitudinal landscape—namely, the differ-
ential way in which we characterize steadfastness of conviction 
depending on whether or not we agree with the position in ques-
tion. 
 These days in public and political arenas, one of the worst 
accusations one can be labeled with is that of the “flip-flopper.” 
While the negative connotation here perhaps originates in the 
idea that the flip-flopper is one who changes their position to 
suit their audience, one who will say anything to get what they 
want (usually elected), the accusation has come to be used to 
deride people who merely change their views on things over 
time. 
 The implicit idea here is having an unvarying, constant 
view on an issue is a good quality. It is a sign of strength of 
conviction: imperviousness to the fickle winds of changing pub-
lic opinion, and resilience to our detractors who would get the 
better of us. In general having the strength of our convictions is 
a necessary quality of strong leadership. Indecision is a weak-
ness and changing one’s decision is even worse, since both are 
somehow signs of not knowing what you want or what is right. 
 Problematically, these very same behaviors receive an en-
tirely different characterization when they are found in someone 
whose views disagree with our own. In this case, the person’s 
unwillingness to reconsider or change their view is a sign that 
they are unable or unwilling to see the error of their ways—that 
they are unwilling to listen to reason, or to see the facts. Here 
people do not demonstrate the strength of their convictions so 
much as an irrational intransigence which makes them obstacles 
to resolution or progress. After all, the only thing worse than 
indecision is being wrong and unwilling to change. Such people 
are not to be praised but avoided entirely, since you can’t get 
anywhere with them. 
 Bringing students to recognize the hypocrisy of this atti-
tude can also help them to recognize the strength of character 
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involved in admitting that you were wrong and learning from 
mistakes. 
 
Agreement and the function of criticism 
 
Another danger of this duplicitous view of commitment is that it 
prompts people to forego efforts to change one another’s minds 
about things they disagree upon, and likewise to be disinclined 
to justify their own views to objectors. The prevailing sentiment 
in the public sphere seems to be that no matter what you do you 
will always have detractors, many of whom will never be won 
over to your views no matter what you say or do. “Haters gonna 
hate.” And, seemingly since you can’t convince everyone, you 
shouldn’t worry about convincing anyone. Further, not only 
should you not waste your efforts trying to persuade your objec-
tors (who aren’t likely to change their minds anyway), but you 
shouldn’t bother with responding to criticism or justifying your-
self, your views, or your decisions at all—unless compelled to 
by some authority. No matter how justified you really are, your 
objectors will never admit it anyway. Combined, these attitudes 
amount to abandoning reason itself as a means to resolve differ-
ences of opinion, or justify judgement, decision, or action. 
 A final strategy for addressing the student who is disin-
clined to accept their rational responsibilities is to offer them a 
different perspective on the function and value of criticism. As 
already mentioned, as pre-critical thinkers we tend to evaluate 
opinions based on whether we like them or agree with them. If 
an opinion is like mine then it is okay, and if it is not then it is 
bad. 
 Criticism, on this view, has a purely negative function. It 
is not employed against things we like. If we already agree with 
something, we don’t challenge or criticize it—in fact we tend to 
let it by without giving it much of a second thought, without ex-
amining it or scrutinizing it too closely. On the other hand, we 
tend to be very critical, indeed dismissive, of things that we 
don’t like. When we cannot ignore a view we disagree with, 
then we unleash criticism upon it. The function of criticism here 
is not usually to change an opponent’s view (since their intran-
sigence is presumed). Rather the function of criticism is to de-
molish their view in the eyes of some audience—to persuade 
some third-party that our opponent’s view is wrong and, there-
by, that ours is right. 
 Against this picture, I offer my students a view of criti-
cism as an opportunity to improve their own view, since our 




©  David Godden.  Informal Logic, Vol. 34, No. 1 (2014), pp. 124-151. 
 
views are strengthened to the extent that they can withstand ra-
tional criticism. Indeed, that we receive criticism from our op-
ponents is at least a sign that our view is important enough that 
it cannot be ignored. Criticism, on this view, is not negative but 
an opportunity to succeed. It is an opportunity to test your opin-
ion to see whether it really is worth having. I encourage my stu-
dents to hold their own, preferred views to the same critical 
standard as those views with which they vehemently disagree—
that they should feel not only a sense of ownership of their 
views, but a sense of accountability for them. 
 
Diversity in the classroom 
 
As educators we are challenged with negotiating a diversity of 
perspectives and identities, ancestries and aspirations, attitudes 
and aptitudes in our classrooms. And, we must accommodate 
this diversity as best as we are able so as to provide an optimal 
environment for learning. Yet, while this means that we must 
structure an environment that is both stimulating and stress-free, 
it does not mean that we should acquiesce to the status-quo. 
Granted, we must create an atmosphere in which students feel 
comfortable to be who they are and to express this in the class-
room. Without this, our students will never engage and the 
learning process can never begin. Yet, this is merely the begin-
ning of the learning process. (No learning has yet occurred!) To 
stop here is merely to allow our students to stagnate and atro-
phy. Learning involves a modification of behavior—a change in 
the learner. Our students must feel comfortable enough to try on 
new ideas and perspectives, and confident enough to admit 
when they are wrong so they can learn from their mistakes. As 
effective educators, we must structure a learning environment 
that allows students not merely to be who they are but to change 




5.  Concluding remarks: The ambiguity of entitlement and 
enlightened discourse 
 
The teaching exercise reported on herein is motivated by an 
“ambiguity of entitlement” that is pervasive in our culture today 
and which has given rise to set of relativistic, anti-rationalistic 
inclinations in a climate of otherwise healthy, rational engage-
ment and dissent. Students, it has seemed to me, enter the uni-
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versity classroom with an awareness of alternative viewpoints, 
but without the critical disposition or skills enabling them to 
meaningfully engage with these differing opinions or to take a 
critical attitude towards their own views. Instead, they are mol-
lycoddled into the disingenuous and relativistic view that every-
one is entitled to their opinion—that challenging or denouncing 
someone’s view is somehow an affront to their person, and that 
all opinions count equally (seemingly because all people do). 
 Such an attitude, together with the moralistic rhetoric of 
tolerance and respect informing it, is not only insincere—since, 
favoring our own opinions over all others, no one treats all opin-
ions as equal—it is irrational and detrimental to the public good. 
That everyone is entitled to their own view excuses anyone from 
having to hold their own opinions up to rational scrutiny, to 
modify them in the face of the better reason, and to engage with 
others in reasoned dialogue. And these pernicious attitudes leave 
the people (whether in the polis, the marketplace, or the acade-
my) with neither the inclination nor the wherewithal to settle 
differences of opinion in a rational, discursive, and civilized 
way. 
 People who claim political entitlement to their views ac-
cept no responsibility for them. Yet by trading on the ambiguity 
of entitlement, they seek to impose obligations on the rest of 
us—obligations that they are not willing to take on themselves. 
Specifically, they expect that their political entitlement to their 
view requires that we should take heed of their opinion and 
place the same stock in it as we do all others when, for example, 
setting public policy. Yet, by shirking the rational responsibili-
ties of giving satisfactory reasons when called upon to do so, 
and of surrendering their view to the force of the better reason, 
they refuse to take heed of, and give credence to, the views of 
others when reaching their own view. In effect, such people are 
refusing to be rational and, in opting out of the process of giving 
and asking for reasons, they are opting out of public discourse. 
Yet, at the same time they expect to be allowed to contribute to 
it. As I said previously, while such people cannot be silenced, 
they should be ignored. The simple truth is that while all people 
are equal, all opinions are not and no one treats them as such. 
The sincere and accountable among us accept the rational re-
sponsibility that comes with discriminating among opinions as 
we all do by favoring our own over others. Those who do not 
accept these obligations are not only irresponsible—both epis-
temically and morally—but disingenuous as well. 
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 Nor is this irresponsibility and disingenuousness a merely 
individual epistemic and moral failing. Clifford, who held that 
believing on insufficient evidence is always a moral failing, 
warned in his 1877 essay The Ethics of Belief that the resulting 




Every time we let ourselves believe for unworthy rea-
sons, we weaken our powers of self-control, of doubting, 
of judicially and fairly weighing evidence. … But a 
greater and wider evil arises when the credulous charac-
ter is maintained and supported, when a habit of believ-
ing for unworthy reasons is fostered and made perma-
nent. If I steal money from any person, there may be no 
harm done from the mere transfer of possession; he may 
not feel the loss, or it may prevent him from using the 
money badly. But I cannot help doing this great wrong 
towards Man, that I make myself dishonest. What hurts 
society is not that it should lose its property, but that it 
should become a den of thieves, for then it must cease to 
be society. This is why we ought not to do evil that good 
may come; for at any rate the great evil has come, that we 
have done evil and are made wicked thereby. In like 
manner, if I let myself believe anything on insufficient 
evidence, there may be no great harm done by the mere 
belief; it may be true after all, or I may never have occa-
sion to exhibit it in outward acts. But I cannot help doing 
this great wrong towards Man, that I make myself credu-
lous. The danger to society is not merely that it should 
believe wrong things, though this is great enough; but 
that it should become credulous, and lose the habit of 
testing things and inquiring into them; for then is must 
sink back into savagery. 
 
Clifford’s warning serves to remind us that the proper function-
ing of a deliberative democracy presupposes not only an active 
and informed citizenry, but also a rational one. Despite our enti-
tlement to make up our own minds in whatever way we see best, 
in public fora we bear an obligation to offer not only opinions 
but also, when challenged, reasons for our opinions, and we 
have a right to expect the same of others. Our inclination to ac-
cept these obligations and claim these rights in public discourse 
derives from our inclination to treat ourselves and each other as 
rational. Deliberative democracy is built not around the princi-
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ples of consensus or compromise, but around the ideal that the 
citizenry will be able to rightly apprehend the relative merits of 
alternative goals and policies and thereby be able to collectively 
judge the best course for society. The social harm, then, in al-
lowing ourselves and our neighbors to relinquish our rational 
responsibilities is that it undermines the very values, skills, and 
dispositions presupposed by democratic society. 
 Indeed, the very political entitlement that we claim when 
making up our own minds as we best see fit is ultimately 
grounded in the enlightenment idea that we are all equally ra-
tional—that none are in a privileged position to know the true 
and the good. This is why the person who claims merely a polit-
ical entitlement for their views while disavowing their rational 
obligations is doubly disingenuous. Not only do they misrepre-
sent the kind of entitlement they are actually claiming (by refus-
ing to exchange their view), they misrepresent the very founda-
tion of their political entitlement. 
 The overarching goal of this teaching exercise is to begin 
to cultivate a sense of rational responsibility in participants, a 
responsibility which I take to be at the center of all critical 
thinking and the public use of reason (which Kant held to be the 
defining feature of an enlightened culture). One of the many 
freedoms of living in a Western, democratic civilization is that 
we live in the wake of liberal rationalism where individuals have 
claimed the right to use their own reason in determining for 
themselves what is true and just—where neither church, nor 
state, nor private interest has the authority to tell us what to 
think. Yet with that right comes an obligation—the obligation to 
take responsibility for our own beliefs and decisions. Perhaps 
acceptance of this responsibility should be a prerequisite of be-
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Appendix: Assignment / Exercise 
 
ASSIGNMENT I: WHAT WOULD IT TAKE TO CHANGE YOUR MIND? 
 
1. What you believe:  
Write a single statement, beginning “I believe that …,” express-
ing something that you firmly believe, or a value that you deeply 
hold. (Choose this carefully! Try to pick something that is sig-
nificant or important to you, something that others might disa-
gree with you about, and something that you are willing to share 
with the class.) 
 
2. What are your reasons?  
Consider the opinion you expressed in (1). Write a short para-
graph giving your reasons for holding your opinion. If you are 
having trouble formulating your reasons, maybe thinking about 
these two questions will help. (i) If you wanted to explain to 
someone else why you have the opinion you do, what would you 
say? (ii) What would you tell another person in order to try to 
persuade them to think the same way as you do about this topic? 
 
3. What would it take to change your mind?  
Write a brief paragraph explaining what it would take to get you 
to change your mind about the belief or value you expressed in 
(1). What could someone say, do, or show you to get you to 
change your opinion?* 
* Two comments: (a) Don’t worry about whether you think an-
yone could actually do this, just write down what they would 
have to do however unlikely or implausible you think it is.(b) If 
the answer is nothing—there is nothing, however unlikely, that 
anyone could say, do, or show you to get you to change your 
mind—then write that down. (Knowing that nothing will get you 
to change your mind about something is just as important as 
knowing what would change your mind.) If, after thinking about 
it, your answer is that nothing would change your mind, go back 
to (1); pick a different belief or value; complete parts (2) and (3) 
for the new belief or value. 
 
4. What might someone else think, and why? 
Consider someone who disagrees with you about what the opin-
ion you expressed (1). Write a short paragraph giving the rea-
sons—the best reasons you can think of—some intelligent, ra-
tional person might have for holding an opinion different from 
your own. 
